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Neuroscientiﬁc  studies  revealed  ﬁrst insights  into  neural  mechanisms  underlying  creativity,  but  existing
ﬁndings  are  highly  variegated  and often  inconsistent.  Despite  the  disappointing  picture  on  the  neuro-
science  of  creativity  drawn  in  recent  reviews,  there  appears  to  be robust  evidence  that  EEG  alpha  power
is particularly  sensitive  to  various  creativity-related  demands  involved  in creative ideation.  Alpha  power
varies as  a function  of  creativity-related  task  demands  and  the  originality  of  ideas,  is  positively  related  to
an individuals’  creativity  level,  and  has  been  observed  to increase  as  a  result  of creativity  interventions.
Alpha  increases  during  creative  ideation  could  reﬂect  more  internally  oriented  attention  that  is  character-
ized by  the  absence  of external  bottom-up  stimulation  and,  thus,  a form  of top-down  activity.  Moreover,
they  could  indicate  the  involvement  of speciﬁc  memory  processes  such  as  the  efﬁcient  (re-)combinationRS
ynchronization
lpha
reativity
of  unrelated  semantic  information.  We  conclude  that  increased  alpha  power  during  creative  ideation  is
among  the  most  consistent  ﬁndings  in  neuroscientiﬁc  research  on  creativity  and discuss  possible  future
directions  to better  understand  the  manifold  brain  mechanisms  involved  in  creativity.
©  2012  Elsevier  Ltd. All  rights  reserved.
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. Introduction
.1. Creativity and neuroscience: the status quo
Creativity is commonly deﬁned as the ability to produce work
hat is both novel (original, unique) and useful within a social
ontext (e.g., Flaherty, 2005; Stein, 1953; Sternberg and Lubart,
996). Besides other classic mental ability constructs such as
ntelligence,1 creativity appears to be crucial or even indispensable
n many areas of our everyday lives, leading some authors to con-
lude that creativity is “. . .a  good attribute for people to possess. . .”
Simonton, 2000, p. 151). It is sorely needed in culture, science and
ducation, likewise in the economical or industrial domain. As a
atter of fact, creativity is becoming increasingly attractive not
nly in the popular domain but also across a broad variety of dif-
erent scientiﬁc disciplines. Meanwhile it has been approached in
he cognitive sciences (e.g., Smith et al., 1995; Ward, 2007), in ped-
gogy or in the educational domain (e.g., Sawyer, 2006), from the
erspective of social psychology (e.g., Amabile, 1983; Hennessey
nd Amabile, 2010), in the context of mental illness (e.g., Kaufman,
005; Fink et al., 2011b) and most recently also in the ﬁeld of neuro-
ciences (see e.g., Arden et al., 2010; Dietrich, 2004, 2007; Dietrich
nd Kanso, 2010; Fink et al., 2007; Jung et al., 2010a,b). Though rel-
vant research in this burgeoning ﬁeld is rapidly growing it seems
evertheless noteworthy that, compared to other mental ability
onstructs such as intelligence, this ﬁeld is only at the beginning
f a long search for potential cognitive and neural mechanisms
nderlying this multifaceted mental ability domain. Up to the
resent, a comparatively low number of approx. 550 scientiﬁc
ublications is available which deal with brain correlates of cre-
tivity (Source: Thomson Reuters © WEB  of KNOWLEDGE; Topic:
Creativity”  AND “Brain”), while there are approx. 19.300 published
apers dealing with the brain-intelligence relationship (ibid.).
This article attempts to show how neuroscientiﬁc studies on cre-
tive ideation using human electroencephalography (EEG) can help
s to learn more about the manifold ways of how creative thought
ight be manifested in our brains. Motivated by the increasing
vailability of new neuroscientiﬁc methodologies, creativity has
ecome increasingly attractive in the neurosciences, and in the
eanwhile a considerable number of studies has been published in
his emerging ﬁeld. These studies investigated brain activity dur-
ng a broad range of different creativity-related tasks (ranging from
ivergent thinking, over insightful problem solving to artistic or
usical creativity) by means of a variety of different neuroimag-
ng methods. Taken together, these studies have produced a large
iversity of ﬁndings and existing review articles on the neuro-
cience of creativity (e.g., Arden et al., 2010; Dietrich and Kanso,
010; Sawyer, 2011) draw rather disappointing conclusions. For
nstance, in reviewing EEG, ERP and neuroimaging studies of cre-
tivity and insight, Dietrich and Kanso (2010) recently came to
he conclusion that “. . . creative thinking does not appear to crit-
cally depend on any single mental process or brain region, and it
s not especially associated with right brains, defocused attention,
ow arousal, or alpha synchronization, as sometimes hypothesized
 . .”  (p. 822). In a similar vein, Arden et al. (2010) found “little
lear evidence of overlap” (p. 143) in the ﬁndings obtained in
1 Throughout the history, many deﬁnitions of intelligence have been proposed,
nd it has been sometimes criticized that there are as many deﬁnitions of intelligence
s  there are researchers attempting to deﬁne this construct (Neubauer and Fink,
009, p. 1005). Meanwhile, some consensus about the core elements of intelligence
as  been achieved and many scientists (e.g., Jung and Haier, 2007; Neubauer and
ink, 2009) refer to Neisser et al.’s (1996) deﬁnition: “Individuals differ from one
nother in their ability to understand complex ideas, to adapt effectively to the
nvironment, to learn from experience, to engage in various forms of reasoning, to
vercome obstacles by taking thought” (p. 77).havioral Reviews 44 (2014) 111–123
different neuroimaging studies of creative cognition. These two
reviews have covered a large amount of studies involving a vari-
ety of creativity tasks investigated by means of a variety of different
neurophysiological methods. At this, it should be noted that creativ-
ity is usually not considered as prime example of a homogeneous
construct. Creativity can be variably deﬁned either as a cognitive
state or event, as a cognitive potential or personality disposition, by
creative expertise, or even by life time creative achievement (e.g.,
Kaufman and Beghetto, 2009).
In addition, a large number of tasks have been conceived which
are thought to capture relevant cognitive processes related to
creativity. They include such different tasks as creative ideation
tasks asking participants to come up with original ideas for open
problems (e.g., alternate uses task), insight tasks involving mis-
leading problem representations which need to be restructured
(e.g., matchstick problems), remote associates problems which
require loose associations to ﬁnd non-obvious semantic relations,
or the production of creative stories, metaphors, paintings, or
melodies (Arden et al., 2010; Dietrich and Kanso, 2010). Moreover,
there are so many different ways such tasks can be realized,
particularly with respect to task instructions (e.g., stressing more
strongly the ﬂuency or the originality facet of creativity), timing
(duration of stimulus presentation, etc.), response modalities
(e.g. button press, verbal response, etc.), control conditions and
so on. This diversity in deﬁning and measuring creativity as
well as the diversity of experimental procedures (e.g., stimuli,
control conditions, timing, response mode, etc.) may  well have
contributed to the difﬁculties in identifying reliable and replicable
brain correlates underlying creativity so far. In addition to this, the
broad diversity of neurophysiological measures and parameters
that were used in this ﬁeld might be also assumed as being
responsible for the fact that no conclusive picture about potential
neural mechanisms underlying creativity has been achieved yet.
Even if we concentrate on EEG studies on creativity, there are
so many different measures or parameters, ranging from event-
related potentials and oscillatory brain activity (in a broad range
of different EEG frequency bands), over coherence or functional
connectivity indicators between different cortical areas (which
are also analyzed in a broad range of different frequency bands),
to measures of dimensional complexity, etc., with each of them
having different functional meanings–that makes it notoriously
difﬁcult to compare and integrate ﬁndings across different studies.
The undertaking of ﬁnding consistent brain mechanisms under-
lying creativity, therefore, requires above all a clear conceptual
deﬁnition of what aspect of the multi-facetted construct of creativ-
ity is actually looked at (Dietrich and Kanso, 2010). Moreover, it is
probably beneﬁcial to focus on speciﬁc tasks and speciﬁc methods
and only extend the scope of research and interpretations as soon
as the initial ﬁndings are well understood. In this article we aim to
speciﬁcally focus on brain correlates of the well-established pro-
cess of creative ideation (or more generally on divergent thinking,
respectively). The generation of creative ideas to open problems
can be considered as key component of creativity, and the creative
ideation approach has already been adopted in a considerable num-
ber of neuroscientiﬁc studies of creativity (see following section for
further deﬁnition). As will be shown in this review, recent studies in
this ﬁeld have yielded evidence that brain activity in the EEG alpha
frequency band is sensitive to various creativity-related demands
involved in creative ideation, thereby revealing a quite consistent
and replicable picture about some promising brain mechanisms
relevant for creativity.1.2. Creative ideation
Creative ideation denotes the process of creating a number of
different original ideas to given open problems. It is conceptualized
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s a cognitive process involving “both the retrieval of existing
nowledge from memory and the combination of various aspects
f existing knowledge into novel ideas” (Paulus and Brown, 2007,
. 252). Creative ideation tasks are commonly called divergent
hinking tasks pointing at the notion that thought “goes off in
ifferent directions” (Guilford, 1959, p. 381). Accordingly, for
ivergent thinking tasks there exist many possible solutions which
ay  differ in their quality. This stands in contrast to convergent
hinking tasks which only have one correct solution. The Guilford
ests which were developed based on the divergent production
omponent in his structure of intellect model (Guilford, 1967)
nclude a number of such divergent thinking tests. A typical
xample is the alternate uses (AU) task which requires participants
o think of many different creative uses for a conventional object
e.g., “brick”). A possible creative response would be to use it as
 “business card that surely will be remembered”, whereas an
ncreative response would be to use it “for building houses”.
esides ideational ﬂuency (i.e., number of generated ideas), and
exibility (i.e., number of different categories), creative task
erformance is often quantiﬁed with respect to the originality of
deas, as assessed by external ratings (similarly to the Consensual
ssessment Technique proposed by Amabile, 1982).
Divergent thinking tasks represent the dominant approach in
he psychometric assessment of creativity (Kaufman et al., 2008).
hey are included in most standard tests of creativity and there
s increasing interest to use them as supplement to traditional
ognitive measures of ability and achievement (Kaufman, 2010).
ivergent thinking tests show good reliability but the evidence
oncerning validity is inconsistent. While it is widely accepted
hat divergent thinking ability reﬂects a useful indicator of cre-
tive potential (Runco and Acar, 2012), it is sometimes doubted
hat divergent thinking scores can predict real-life creative achieve-
ents. So far, a number of studies have supported reasonable
redictive validity of divergent thinking (e.g., Plucker, 1999), but
he validity may  be limited when it comes to predict outstanding
reative achievements which crucially depend on persistence and
xpertise (Ericsson et al., 1993; Weisberg, 2006).
Neuroscientiﬁc studies have also commonly employed diver-
ent thinking tasks which, however, have to be adapted according
o the restrictions of neuroscientiﬁc methods (cf. Fink et al., 2007). A
ingle divergent thinking task often takes between 2 and 5 minutes
uring which participants are requested to generate creative ideas
o a given stimulus (with open eyes). Brain activation related to
reative idea generation is usually assessed by contrasting brain
ctivation during task performance to activation during a pre-task
eference period. Moreover, it needs to be taken care to separate the
rocess of thinking about ideas from the actual vocalization of ideas.
his can be achieved by deﬁning time periods either reserved for
reative thought or by using variable time markers (e.g., requesting
articipants to push buttons prior and after giving a response). This
llows for a proper attribution of the relevant cognitive process and
lso avoids motor artifacts related to speech.
.3. EEG methodologies in the context of creative ideation
Neuroimaging techniques such as functional magnetic res-
nance imaging (fMRI), near infrared spectroscopy (NIRS), the
easurement of the brain’s glucose metabolism via positron
mission tomography (PET), or the analysis of different parameters
n the EEG allow us to investigate the way the brain works when
ngaged in the performance of different creativity tasks. Each of
hese measurement methods has its pros and cons in the particular
ontext of the study of creativity. The primary advantage of fMRI
ies in its high spatial accuracy, but it does not allow for the study
f cognitive processes with high temporal resolution (as opposed
o EEG techniques). The observed changes in brain activity (e.g.,havioral Reviews 44 (2014) 111–123 113
blood-oxygen-level dependent [BOLD] response) occur rather
slowly, thereby complicating the analysis of time-related brain
activity patterns during the process of creative cognition. EEG
techniques, in contrast, show considerably lower spatial resolution
but allow for a much more ﬁne-grained temporal analysis of
brain activation that could be observed, for instance, in response
to a particular cognitive event (e.g., immediately prior to the
production of an original idea). Both, fMRI and EEG approaches
in this ﬁeld are challenged to decompose the complex construct
of creativity into measureable cognitive processes that can be
adequately investigated in the neuro-lab; at the same time, they
need to capture “real-life creativity” to the best possible extent.
Concerning the latter issue, the EEG environment might provide
slightly better conditions for creativity than studies using fMRI, in
which participants are required to lie supine in the noisy scanner.
EEG activity can be quantiﬁed in many different ways and many
techniques have already been successfully employed in the study
of creativity (cf. Bazanova, 2012; Bhattacharya and Petsche, 2005;
Mölle et al., 1999; Srinivasan, 2007). These methods include var-
ious parameters such as the assessment of changes in spectral
power in different EEG frequency bands, the method of event-
related potentials (ERP), or the analysis of functional connectivity
(or functional coupling, respectively) between different cortical
areas. The present article focusses on the analysis of task- or
event-related changes in spectral power. The EEG signal repre-
sents oscillations observed across a wide range of frequencies
which are commonly divided into distinct frequency bands (e.g.,
alpha band: 8–12 Hz, beta band: 13–30 Hz). Spectral analyses of
the EEG can be used to compute the band-speciﬁc frequency
power for given periods of time. Additionally, task- or event-related
power changes can be quantiﬁed by contrasting the power in
a speciﬁed frequency band during a cognitive task (e.g., a cre-
ativity task) with a preceding reference interval. Event-related
power decreases from a reference to an activation interval are
commonly referred to as event-related desynchronization (ERD),
while power increases are referred to as event-related synchro-
nization (ERS; Pfurtscheller, 1999). ERD/ERS of the alpha band
has been found to be especially sensitive to cognitive task perfor-
mance and higher cognitive abilities (e.g., Neubauer et al., 2006;
Neubauer and Fink, 2009). To date, the ERS/ERD method has
been employed in a variety of studies covering a broad range
of different cognitive task demands (excellent reviews are given
in Klimesch, 1999; Klimesch et al., 2007; Neuper and Klimesch,
2006). Just to illustrate the broad range of application of this
method, Jausˇovec et al. (2006) measured ERS/ERD during spatial
rotation, Karrasch et al. (1998) during the performance of audi-
tory lexical matching tasks, or Bastiaansen and Hagoort (2006)
investigated ERD effects during language processing or compre-
hension. In other studies, the ERD method was used during visual
information processing (Pfurtscheller et al., 1994), reasoning (Fink
and Neubauer, 2004) or in the context of memory processing
(Doppelmayr et al., 2005; Grabner et al., 2004; Krause et al., 2000;
Stipacek et al., 2003).
Research on alpha ERS/ERD reveals evidence that different pat-
terns of alpha (de-)synchronization can be observed when the
broad alpha frequency range (approximately in the range between
8 and 12 Hz) is subdivided into different alpha sub-bands (see
Klimesch, 1999). Speciﬁcally, lower alpha ERD (∼8–10 Hz) has
been found as being more likely to reﬂect general task demands
such as attentional processes (basic alertness, vigilance or arousal).
ERD in the upper alpha band (∼10–12 Hz), in contrast, has been
observed as being more sensitive to speciﬁc task requirements
(e.g., semantic memory processes; see e.g., Doppelmayr et al., 2002,
2005; Klimesch et al., 2000). Finally, the ERS/D method has been
found to warrant a high psychometric quality (i.e., re-test reliabil-
ity, internal consistency; cf. Burgess and Gruzelier, 1996; Krause
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t al., 2001; Neuper et al., 2005), therewith substantiating its valu-
ble role in the context of neuroscientiﬁc individual differences
esearch (Neubauer et al., 2006). Hence, in applying this mea-
urement method we are well equipped for the complex study of
reative ideation.
. Empirical ﬁndings on the relationship between creative
deation and EEG alpha power
.1. First ﬁndings
The American psychologist Colin Martindale was  one of the
rst who related EEG alpha wave activity to creative ideation.
e showed that highly creative individuals were more likely to
xhibit higher EEG alpha wave activity than less creative indi-
iduals while performing the alternate uses test (Martindale and
ines, 1975). In a subsequent study, Martindale and Hasenfus
1978) observed a higher level of alpha activity while participants
ere instructed to think of a story (i.e., inspirational phase) than
uring an analogue of creative elaboration (i.e., writing down the
tory). In a second experiment of that study (cf. Martindale and
asenfus, 1978), half of the participants were instructed to be as
reative and original as possible (originality instruction), while such
n instruction was omitted for the other half of the participants.
nterestingly, creative participants who received the originality
nstruction exhibited more alpha during inspiration than creative
ontrol subjects (receiving no originality instruction).
Since these early ﬁndings of Martindale and colleagues, EEG
esearch on creativity came to rest for a comparatively long period
f time. Only approx. a quarter of a century later, a revival of rele-
ant research activities in this ﬁeld can be detected, initialized by
 couple of highly relevant publications such as those by Jausˇovec
1997, 2000), Mölle et al. (1999) or Razumnikova (2000). By now,
 considerable number of EEG studies have yielded consistent evi-
ence hinting at a particular role of EEG alpha oscillations in the
ontext of creative ideation. These studies have approached this
opic from different perspectives. They can be roughly categorized
nto studies that looked at (1) the effects of creative (vs. non-
reative) task demands, (2) the originality of ideas, (3) individual
ifferences in creativity, and (4) creativity enhancing interventions.
n the following we will review evidence in these ﬁelds.
.2. EEG alpha power as a function of creative task demands
As initially suggested by the pioneering work of Colin Martin-
ale (cf. Martindale and Hasenfus, 1978), EEG alpha wave activity
ppears to be sensitive to different creativity-related task demands.
eanwhile this observation has been corroborated in different
tudies using varying task demands (e.g., Fink et al., 2007; Jauk et al.,
012; Jausˇovec, 1997; Krug et al., 2003; Mölle et al., 1999). Jausˇovec
1997) compared alpha power (7.5–13 Hz) related to problem solv-
ng of well-deﬁned vs. ill-deﬁned problems. In the well-deﬁned
roblem task participants had to ﬁnd the correct solution to the
issionaries and cannibals task, whereas in the ill-deﬁned task par-
icipants were instructed to ﬁnd explanations for the shapes of the
umbers 1–9. He found that solving the ill-deﬁned problems was
elated to higher alpha power in posterior regions of the brain than
olving the well-deﬁned task. He also noted that this pattern was
eversed during an initial phase of reading and planning, and it
as not evident in another experiment which did not discriminate
hese problem solving stages.
Mölle et al. (1999) contrasted EEG brain activity during diver-
ent (e.g., alternate uses task, consequences task) vs. convergent
hinking tasks (intelligence test tasks such as mental arithmetic)
nd they observed evidence that divergent thinking was associatedhavioral Reviews 44 (2014) 111–123
with more alpha power (8–12.1 Hz) than convergent thinking at
central and parietal sites. Krug et al. (2003) tested women in two
experiments and compared EEG power during divergent thinking
in the consequences task (participants had to think of as many
unique consequences as possible given the hypothetic scenario
that people no longer had to eat) with a convergent thinking task
(subtest arithmetical thinking from the Hamburg-Wechsler Intelli-
gence Scale; Wechsler, 1981). In both experiments they found that
alpha power (8–12.1 Hz) was higher during the divergent thinking
task than during the convergent thinking task. This experiment was
actually on the effect of treatments with estrogen or testosterone,
but it was  reported that these treatments had no effects on the
power in the alpha band. Shemyakina et al. (2007) also examined
the spectral power related to divergent thinking. Participants were
presented with the beginning part of well-known proverbs and
had either to make up a different ending for them which would
change their meaning (divergent thinking task), or to recite the
correct common ending of it (convergent control condition). They
found that the divergent task resulted in somewhat higher upper
alpha power in posterior regions of the right hemisphere, but these
alpha effects were not as robust as the observed power increases
in upper beta band or gamma  frequency bands.
Similarly, Fink et al. (2007) investigated task- or event-related
alpha power changes (creative idea generation vs. reference)
while individuals worked on four different types of creative idea
generation tasks. Besides the alternate uses (AU) task and the
consequences task (here called utopian situation task; US), they
also used the insight (IS) task, where participants were confronted
with unusual, hypothetical situations that were in need of expla-
nation (e.g., ﬁnd reasons for “a light in the darkness”), and the
word ends task (WE), where German sufﬁxes had to be completed
by the participants in many different ways. Behavioral analyses
of the employed creative idea generation tasks revealed that the
employed tasks notably differ with respect to their task demands.
This was evident by the ﬁnding that performance in the IS, US and
AU task (as opposed to the WE  task) was  more strongly corre-
lated with the big ﬁve personality factor “openness to experiences”
which is seen in relation to creativity (e.g., Feist, 1998; King et al.,
1996). In contrast, completing sufﬁxes (i.e., performance of the WE
task) was signiﬁcantly correlated with verbal intelligence (Benedek
et al., 2006; Fink et al., 2006, 2007), while in the IS, US and AU
task no correlation with verbal ability was  apparent at all. Thus,
the IS, US and AU tasks seem to rely more strongly on diver-
gent, free-associative demands, while the WE  task rather involves
more convergent, intelligence-related demands. Most interest-
ingly, these behavioral task differences were also reﬂected at the
neurophysiological level. All tasks were accompanied by compara-
tively strong alpha synchronization at frontal sites, but they differed
signiﬁcantly at more posterior recording sites (see Fink et al., 2007).
Speciﬁcally, the AU, IS, and US task were accompanied by relatively
strong alpha synchronization in the upper alpha band (10–12 Hz),
whereas in the more intelligence-related WE  task the lowest syn-
chronization of alpha activity was observed, suggesting that the
more creativity-related a task is (e.g., ﬁnding original alternate
solutions as opposed to completing sufﬁxes) the stronger is the
synchronization of alpha activity (Fink et al., 2007).
This notion is further corroborated by recent ﬁndings of Jauk
et al. (2012), who  aimed at discriminating EEG brain activation
related to convergent vs. divergent modes of thinking within the
same task. In this study, participants worked on the AU task and
a word association task and were either instructed to generate
common, typical responses (i.e., convergent condition) or uncom-
mon, creative responses (i.e., divergent condition). In both tasks,
the convergent response condition resulted in a much stronger
task-related desynchronization of alpha activity than the divergent
response condition, which rather tended to show synchronization
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f alpha activity over frontal cortical sites. This indicates that the
mount of task-related alpha activity can be directly attributed to
he mode of task-processing (convergent or divergent thinking),
nd that this effect can even be observed at more elementary cog-
itive tasks such as word association.
However, there are also studies that appear to be at odds
ith the notion that creative ideation is related to task-related
ncreases of alpha power. Razumnikova (2000; for a similar
tudy see Razumnikova, 2004) analyzed spectral power during a
onvergent thinking task (mental arithmetic task: mentally add
ubsequent numbers) and a divergent thinking task (the snake
roblem: “There are hundreds of poisonous snakes in a zoo. How
ill it be possible to measure the lengths of each snake?”). Both
ognitive tasks were performed with closed eyes for 5 minutes and
ere compared to an initial 5 minute rest period. She found that
ower and upper alpha power were signiﬁcantly lower during the
ognitive tasks than during the rest period. This result was  inter-
reted in terms of alpha desynchronization which would oppose
he reported ﬁndings of task-related alpha synchronization. It
hould be noted that this study (and the 2004 study) differed from
he other task-related power studies in the aspects that a very
ong initial rest period was used as reference for both tasks (rather
han short reference periods preceding every single task; cf. Fink
t al., 2007, 2009a; see also original ERD approach by Pfurtscheller
nd Aranibar, 1977; Pfurtscheller, 1999) and that the tasks were
erformed with closed eyes. It is possible that alpha power during
he divergent thinking task was quite high but not as high as during
 ﬁve minute rest period. The different results may  thus possibly
e due to the different realization of reference and task conditions.
Another reason could be assumed in the employed task
tself. Razumnikova and colleagues recently used association tasks
equiring participants to ﬁnd an original association to single
ords or triads of words (e.g., Razumnikova, 2007a,b; Razumnikova
t al., 2009). These tasks were generally reported to be associ-
ted with alpha decreases relative to a long pre-task reference
eriod. One study provided detailed topographic analyses, revea-
ing that desynchronization was actually restricted to central and
osterior regions of the brain but was not found in frontal regions
Razumnikova, 2007a). This ﬁnding is in line with the study by Jauk
t al. (2012) showing that simple association tasks generally show
ower alpha power than more demanding creative idea generation
asks. Moreover, they also observed no desynchronization at frontal
rain regions but only at central and some posterior areas.
In another study, Jausˇovec and Jausˇovec (2000) contrasted ver-
al and ﬁgural divergent production tasks which were adapted
rom creativity tests (e.g., name all things you can think of that will
ake noise; alternate uses of a mobile tire; thinking creatively with
ncompleted pictures, etc.) with dialectic problems (e.g., thinking
bout an essay on the Livian war). Both tasks required open solu-
ions, but they differed with respect to the level of creativity needed
o solve them. The authors observed that alpha power effects in
he lower and to some extent in the upper alpha band were merely
elated to stimulus modality (higher alpha power for verbal than
or ﬁgural tasks) and less strongly to the problem type (divergent
roduction vs. dialectic problems). A possible explanation for not
nding alpha power differences between both problem types could
e that both require open solutions, as it is typically the case in
reativity tasks.
.3. EEG alpha power as a function of originality of generated
deasRather than merely focusing on divergent and convergent
odes of thinking, relevant research in this ﬁeld has also addressed
he research question as to how brain states during the production
f more original ideas might be differentiated from those observedhavioral Reviews 44 (2014) 111–123 115
during the production of less original ideas. In doing so, Fink and
Neubauer (2006) were able to demonstrate that more original (as
opposed to less original) ideas (as assessed via external ratings; cf.
Amabile, 1982) were accompanied by a stronger alpha synchro-
nization at centroparietal recording sites.
Grabner et al. (2007) extended the ﬁndings of Fink and Neubauer
(2006) in two  important ways. First, EEG activity was assessed
in relation to self-rated originality of ideas. For this reason, par-
ticipants were requested to evaluate each single idea they gave
during the experiment with respect to its originality subsequent
to the recording session. And second, as creative ideation pre-
sumably requires functional cooperation between different brain
areas, Grabner et al. (2007) calculated event-related functional cou-
pling or the phase locking value (PLV) between selected pairs of
electrodes (cf. Lachaux et al., 1999). Several ﬁndings of this study
appear to be noteworthy: First, similar to Fink and Neubauer (2006),
creative idea generation was generally accompanied by an event-
related alpha synchronization. Second, and more importantly, the
obtained ﬁndings also suggest that the production of ideas that
were subjectively rated as more original was reﬂected in a differ-
ent activity pattern of the brain than the production of less original
ideas. Analyses revealed that the production of more original ideas
exhibited a larger right-hemispheric alpha synchronization than
the production of less original ideas, whereas in the left hemi-
sphere no differences in relation to self-rated originality of ideas
were found. This effect was signiﬁcant for the lower alpha band but
not in the upper alpha band. In addition, more original ideas were
associated with stronger functional coupling of anterior cortices
of the right hemisphere, while in the left hemisphere no signif-
icant PLV differences between more and less original responses
emerged.
2.4. Individual differences in creativity
The studies presented so far used a within-subjects approach
comparing tasks with varying creativity-related task demands or
more vs. less creative ideas. Beyond that there also exist a number
of studies which related inter-individual differences in creativity
to EEG alpha power. The studies by Martindale and colleagues
(1975, 1978) already revealed some evidence that higher creativ-
ity was related to higher alpha power. In a later study, Martindale
et al. (1984) reported evidence that high creative participants (as
operationalized by higher scores in the AU task and the remote
associates task) showed lower alpha power in the right hemi-
sphere during creative task performance which was interpreted in
terms of higher activity of the right hemisphere. This was, how-
ever, only true for participants who scored high in both tasks,
whereas for all other participants the general activation pattern
involved higher alpha power in the right hemisphere (see exper-
iment I and II, but not experiment III, which involves a drawing
task).
Jausˇovec (2000) compared alpha power measures of high and
low creative people (based on performance in the Torrance Test;
Torrance, 1966) in a number of divergent thinking tasks and also
considered the role of intelligence. He found that high creative peo-
ple showed much higher alpha activity across the entire scalp in
the lower and upper alpha band while working on divergent pro-
duction problems than less creative people, whereas there was no
effect in these tasks related to intelligence. Similar ﬁndings were
obtained by Fink and Neubauer (2008), who showed that more cre-
ative people (and especially those who  were also more extraverted)
showed higher alpha power during creative ideation in two diver-
gent thinking tasks.
In Fink et al. (2009a) participants were divided into a group
of lower and higher originality based on the originality/creativity
of ideas they generated during the AU task. As shown in Fig. 1,
116 A. Fink, M. Benedek / Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 44 (2014) 111–123
Fig. 1. Task-related changes in EEG alpha power (upper alpha band, 10–12 Hz) during the generation of creative/original uses in the Alternative Uses (AU) task. Blue
regions indicate increases in alpha power relative to rest. AF: anteriofrontal; F: frontal; FC: frontocentral; CT: centrotemporal; CP: centroparietal; PT: parietotemporal; PO:
parietooccipital. Participants’ task was to generate alternative uses of conventional everyday objects such as “umbrella”, “pencil” or “vase of ﬂowers”, etc. Based on the
originality of ideas, the total sample was divided into a group of lower (n = 25) and into a group of higher originality (n = 22). Both groups showed comparatively strong
increases in alpha power (relative to a pre-stimulus reference interval) over anteriofrontal sites. Higher original individuals exhibited a hemispheric asymmetry with respect
to  alpha activity, with stronger increases in alpha in the right than in the left hemisphere, while in lower original individuals no hemispheric differences emerged. Figure
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reative idea generation was generally associated with compar-
tively strong task-related synchronization of alpha (10–12 Hz)
t frontal sites, while at more posterior recording positions even
mall alpha desynchronization was observed. Interestingly, in com-
aring both originality/creativity groups, we observed that more
riginal individuals (i.e., those who performed well on the AU
ask) exhibited a comparatively strong hemispheric asymmetry
ith respect to alpha activity, with stronger task-related alpha
ynchronization in the right than in the left hemisphere. For less
riginal individuals (who generated ideas of lower originality),
owever, no hemispheric differences with respect to alpha activ-
ty emerged (see Fig. 1). In another study, Fink et al. (2009b) found
hat a group of professional dancers with perennial professional
xperience in improvisation dance showed stronger task-related
lpha synchronization (10–12 Hz) during AU performance at pos-
erior (i.e., centroparietal, parietotemporal and parietooccipital)
ecording sites than a group of novices. Moreover, professional
ancers showed higher upper alpha synchronization than novices
lso during the imagination of an improvisation dance which was
ot evident during imagining of a standard dance involving a
onotonous sequence of steps and movements.
Similar ﬁndings were also reported by Razumnikova (2007a)
nd Razumnikova and colleagues (2009). Razumnikova (2007a)
bserved evidence that more original individuals (operational-
zed via the originality of responses in a RAT-like association test)showed higher amplitudes in the lower alpha band (8–10 Hz). And
in a later study, Razumnikova et al. (2009; article in Russian, only
abstract in English available) found that highly creative individuals
exhibited a higher level of lower alpha power (8–10 Hz) during
verbal creative ideation. With respect to the upper alpha band
(10–13 Hz), high (vs. low) creative individuals showed more power
mostly at anterior and parietal cortical sites.
2.5. Effects of creativity enhancing interventions
The particular sensitivity of EEG alpha activity to creative cog-
nition is also nicely substantiated by evidence that alpha power
increases as a result of a verbal creativity training. Fink et al. (2006)
reported a study in which participants received a computerized
training of creativity composed of different creativity problems
such as inventing names, ﬁnding slogans or ﬁnding nicknames
(for details see Benedek et al., 2006). The training, which could
be installed and performed on any home-PC, took roughly about
two weeks to complete and participants were requested to exer-
cise about half an hour per day. In applying a pretest-posttest
design with the training in between, we observed a higher origi-
nality of ideas in the trained (as compared to the control) group.
Moreover, this training effect was also reﬂected in stronger alpha
synchronization at frontal sites (in the lower alpha band but not
in the upper alpha band) in the training than in the control group
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fter completing the training. Based on this promising evidence,
ink et al. (2011a) recently investigated whether alpha activity is
lso sensitive to more short-lasting creativity interventions. Par-
icipants performed the AU task while the EEG was  recorded and
ere exposed to three different experimental conditions. In the
ognitive stimulation condition, participants worked on the AU
ask subsequent to a short intervention in which they were – as
t is the case in classic group-based creativity techniques such as
rainstorming – confronted with creative ideas of other people
cf. Dugosh et al., 2000; Dugosh and Paulus, 2005). In the affective
timulation condition, participants had to generate creative ideas
fter the presentation of sound clips of merrily laughing people.
elevant experimental studies demonstrated that positive affect
s contagious and can be elicited by short auditory stimuli pre-
enting human vocal affect expressions such as laughter (Hietanen
t al., 1998; Meyer et al., 2005; Warren et al., 2006). In the control
ondition no intervention was applied. In each experimental con-
ition, participants were instructed to respond as creatively and
s originally as possible. Creative cognition generally elicited alpha
ynchronization, most prominent in the prefrontal cortex and in
he right hemisphere. In addition to this, it was  also shown that
timulating creativity via the exposure to other people’s ideas and
ia positive affect was associated with stronger alpha increases at
refrontal cortical sites as compared to the control condition (no
ntervention).
.6. Summary of empirical ﬁndings
The preceding sections reviewed existing ﬁndings on the rela-
ionship between EEG alpha power and creative ideation. In a
utshell, the majority of reviewed studies reveals evidence that
he process of creative idea generation can be characterized by
ncreases in alpha power (i.e., task-related alpha synchronization
r at least absence of alpha desynchronization, respectively), par-
icularly apparent at prefrontal and (right) posterior parietal sites.
dditionally, there is also convincing evidence which suggests that
ask-related power changes in the EEG alpha band are sensitive to
ertain creativity-related factors. Speciﬁcally, on the basis of exist-
ng ﬁndings in this ﬁeld it can be concluded that EEG alpha power
aries as a function of the creativity-related task demands (the
ore creative a task, the higher the level of alpha; Fink et al., 2007;
auk et al., 2012; Jausˇovec, 1997; Krug et al., 2003) and the original-
ty of ideas (Fink and Neubauer, 2006; Grabner et al., 2007). Also,
EG alpha power has been observed as being related to an indi-
iduals’ creativity level (more alpha in higher creative individuals;
.g., Fink and Neubauer, 2008; Fink et al., 2009a, b; Jausˇovec, 2000;
artindale and Hines, 1975; Martindale and Hasenfus, 1978). In
ddition, research in this ﬁeld also suggests that alpha band power
ncreases as a result of interventions aiming to enhance creativ-
ty (Fink et al., 2006, 2011a). The available ﬁndings thus strongly
uggest that creative cognitive processes are reﬂected by increased
lpha power levels in the brain.
Concerning the potential speciﬁcity of lower and upper alpha
ower for creativity there appears to be no clear evidence. Some
tudies reported higher sensitivity of the lower alpha band (e.g.,
ink et al., 2006; Grabner et al., 2007; Razumnikova, 2007a), while
ome reported higher sensitivity of the upper alpha band (e.g., Fink
t al., 2009a,b, 2011a; Shemyakina et al., 2007). A larger number
f studies, however, did either not differentiate between lower and
pper alpha band power (e.g., Krug et al., 2003; Mölle et al., 1999) or
bserved ﬁndings according to which any creativity-related effects
o not strongly depend on a discrimination of lower vs. upper
lpha band but rather apply to the entire alpha band (e.g., Fink and
eubauer, 2008; Jauk et al., 2012; Jausˇovec, 2000; Razumnikova,
000; see also Benedek et al., 2011).havioral Reviews 44 (2014) 111–123 117
3. The potential meaning of EEG alpha oscillations in the
context of creative ideation
3.1. Alpha synchronization and cortical idling
As outlined in Neuper and Pfurtscheller (2001), the ERD of alpha
band activity presumably reﬂects an increased excitability level
of neurons in the involved cortical areas, which could be related
to an enhanced information transfer in thalamo-cortical circuits
(Pfurtscheller and Lopes da Silva, 1999). Relevant ﬁndings in this
ﬁeld clearly demonstrate that alpha band ERD could be seen as
functional correlate of brain activation (Klimesch et al., 1999). In
contrast, event-related synchronization (ERS) of alpha band power
(i.e., increases in alpha power from the pre-stimulus reference
to the task performance interval) has traditionally been thought
to reﬂect a state of reduced active information processing in the
underlying neuronal networks (Pfurtscheller and Lopes da Silva,
1999) or “cortical idling” (Pfurtscheller, 1999; Pfurtscheller et al.,
1996). This notion was  derived from the common observation that
most cognitive tasks usually result in desynchronization of alpha
when comparing alpha power during task processing with a pre-
task reference period. Moreover, opening the eyes typically results
in alpha suppression, whereas alpha power increases during closed
eyes conditions. The latter is usually attributed to a decrease of
active information processing given that the information stream
from the visual system is interrupted. Early ﬁndings of creativity
and frontal alpha synchronization therefore assumed that increases
in alpha could reﬂect some kind of “hypofrontality” in which func-
tions attributed to systematic-analytic problem solving might be
temporarily suppressed (e.g., Dietrich, 2003; Fink and Neubauer,
2006). However, as an increasing number of EEG studies reported
task-related increases of alpha power in response to a broad range
of different cognitive task demands, it has become increasingly less
probable that alpha synchronization merely reﬂects reduced men-
tal activity or cortical idling (Buzsáki and Draguhn, 2004; Klimesch
et al., 2007; Ward, 2003). Fink et al. (2009a) reported a further test
of whether alpha synchronization in creative ideation is indica-
tive of an increase or a decrease of cortical activation (i.e., cortical
idling) by combining the methods of EEG and fMRI. They found
that creative cognition tasks were associated with frontal alpha
synchronization in the EEG study, while the same tasks showed
an increase of the BOLD response in frontal brain regions in the
fMRI study. This ﬁnding strongly suggests that alpha synchroniza-
tion during creative ideation reﬂects an active cognitive process
rather than cortical idling.
3.2. Alpha synchronization as a sign of internal processing
demands
Meanwhile there is a large body of evidence which indicates
that synchronization of alpha activity does not solely reﬂect cortical
deactivation or cortical idling (e.g., Cooper et al., 2003; Jensen et al.,
2002; Klimesch et al., 1999, 2007; Ray and Cole, 1985; Sauseng et al.,
2005). Rather it seems that alpha synchronization is particularly
sensitive to sensory inhibition or internal processing demands. For
instance, Jensen et al. (2002) interpreted their ﬁnding of an increase
of alpha activity over occipital-parietal sites with increasing mem-
ory load as being indicative of some kind of suppression of the input
from the visual system, which would disturb working memory
processing in frontal brain areas (cf. Ray and Cole, 1985). Klimesch
et al. (1999) observed event-related synchronization of alpha activ-
ity during the retention interval of a memory task which they
referred to as “paradoxical alpha synchronization in a memory task”
(p. 493; see also Krause et al., 1995, 1996), as this result is contrary
to the usual ﬁnding that alpha desynchronizes when individuals
are engaged in the performance of cognitively demanding tasks. In
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 similar vein, Sauseng et al. (2005) observed alpha synchronization
n prefrontal areas during working memory processing which they
nterpreted in a manner that “. . . frontal areas must not become
nvolved in (distracting) new activities as long as an ongoing work-
ng memory task is carried out” (p. 154). In another highly relevant
tudy in this ﬁeld, Cooper et al. (2003) compared EEG alpha activity
elated to tasks requiring sensory processing of visual, haptic and
coustic stimuli with a condition requiring the mental imagination
f these stimuli. They found that internally-directed attention in
he mental imagination tasks yielded stronger alpha power than
xternally-directed attention in the sensory-intake tasks, and that
lpha power also increased with increasing task demands. In all
f the cited studies, alpha synchronization has been interpreted as
 functional correlate of inhibition or top-down control (see e.g.,
auseng et al., 2005; Klimesch et al., 2007). According to that view,
lpha increases may  reﬂect an inhibition of cognitive processes
hat are not directly relevant for task performance (e.g., retrieval
f interfering information during a retention interval of a working
emory task), and are observed “. . . over sites that probably are
nder, or exert top-down control.” (Klimesch et al., 2007, p. 63).
.3. The role of frontal alpha synchronization in creative ideation
Benedek et al. (2011) recently examined to what extent alpha
ynchronization is related to general internal processing demands
r to other speciﬁc creativity-related processes. They devised a con-
ergent thinking task (i.e., ﬁnding 4-letter anagram solutions) and
 divergent thinking task (i.e., creating original sentences with four
iven initial letters) which had to be performed either involving
ow or high internal processing demands. The experimental con-
ition involving high internal processing demands was  realized by
asking the stimulus letters after a brief encoding period of half
 second, ensuring that the task had to be processed internally.
n the condition involving low internal processing demands, the
timulus remained visible and thus allowed for steady bottom-
p processing. In this study, frontal alpha synchronization was
ound only in the high internal processing condition – but for both
he convergent and the divergent thinking task. It was concluded
hat frontal alpha synchronization reﬂects a state of high internal
rocessing demands which may  be prevalent in divergent but also
n convergent tasks. Importantly, divergent thinking was  accompa-
ied by alpha synchronization at right posterior parietal sites, while
onvergent thinking was not, which may  point at an activation
attern that is speciﬁc for creative thought.
Prefrontal alpha synchronization during creative ideation could
hus generally reﬂect a state of high internal processing demands or
 state of enhanced internally oriented attention (Knyazev, 2007).
his is in line with other studies showing that alpha power is
educed when participants have to respond to external stimuli as
ompared to internal mental processing, and that alpha power is
nhanced during mental imagery and imagination tasks (Ray and
ole, 1985; Cooper et al., 2003, 2006). This view is also supported
y Von Stein and Sarnthein (2000), who suggest that alpha activity
eﬂects the absence of stimulus-driven, external bottom up stimu-
ation and, thus “is maximal in situations where cortical processes
 . . are driven by free ﬂoating associations, mental imagery, plan-
ing, etc.” (p. 311). Such a state of internal attention is prevalent
n creative ideation tasks. Let us consider the common divergent
hinking task of generating alternate uses e.g. for a brick. Once
he stimulus word is encoded, this task does usually not involve
ny further bottom-up sensory processing. It rather involves mem-
ry processes for the retrieval of known uses, for the scanning
f object properties which might cue new uses and for accessing
emote associations which can be recombined to useful new ideas
Benedek et al., 2012b; Gilhooly et al., 2007). This is especially true
or creative ideation tasks in the verbal domain using conceptualhavioral Reviews 44 (2014) 111–123
stimuli but it might be less true for ﬁgural ideation tasks which
require stronger sensory processing of the visuo-spatial stimulus
properties (cf. Jausˇovec and Jausˇovec, 2000).
Moreover, prefrontal alpha was  also conceived to indicate
top-down control which serves to actively inhibit task-irrelevant
activity such as irrelevant sensory processing or the retrieval of
interfering information (Klimesch et al., 2007; Sauseng et al., 2005).
This may  be particular relevant for creative ideation which is known
to involve effective executive processes such as the inhibition of
dominant associations and of prepotent response tendencies (Beaty
and Silvia, 2012; Benedek et al., 2012a; Gilhooly et al., 2007). How-
ever, it should be noted that internal processing and top-down
control are not speciﬁc to the process of creative ideation but
are also relevant in many other cognitive tasks (Benedek et al.,
2011). It can rather be assumed that efﬁcient internal processing
and top-down control are essential – but certainly not the only –
characteristics of creative ideation.
3.4. The role of parietal alpha synchronization in creative ideation
Alpha synchronization during creative ideation is also often seen
over posterior parietal and occipital sites (e.g., Fink et al., 2009a,b;
Jausˇovec, 1997; Mölle et al., 1999). This ﬁnding does not seem to
be restricted to creative ideation tasks but has been observed in
other creativity-related tasks as well (e.g., imagining dancing: Fink
et al., 2009b; insightful problem solving: Jung-Beeman et al., 2004;
music imagery: Schaefer et al., 2011). Kounios et al. (2006) observed
evidence that neural activity prior to problem presentation predicts
whether problems are subsequently solved with insight (accompa-
nied by subjective experience of “AHA!”, as a reﬂection of a sudden
conscious availability of a solution) or in an analytical manner. The
authors found less alpha over a broad region of the posterior cor-
tex prior to non-insightful, analytical problem solving which they
interpreted in a manner that preparing for analytical problem solv-
ing was  more likely realized in directing attention outwardly (i.e.,
in a more bottom-up fashion), while the preparation for solving
upcoming tasks with insight was  in contrast associated with focus-
ing attention more inwardly (see also Kounios et al., 2008; Kounios
and Beeman, 2009). Increased alpha over occipital-parietal sites
has therefore commonly been interpreted as suppression of dis-
tracting information ﬂow from the visual system (e.g., Jensen et al.,
2002). At this, frontal brain regions may  exert top-down control
over posterior regions which might be mediated by functional cou-
pling between these brain regions (Klimesch et al., 2007; Sauseng
et al., 2005).
The complex process of creative ideation can certainly not
satisfactorily be explained by the mere absence of bottom-up stim-
ulation. As mentioned before, it must beyond that also involve
other cognitive processes such as memory retrieval and association
processes (Benedek et al., 2012b). That is, creative ideation (and
creativity in a broader sense, respectively) certainly requires the
retrieval of stored knowledge and the (re-)combination of stored
memory elements into a new creative solution. Dietrich (2004)
already supposed that tasks that draw more strongly on memory
appear to be more likely to involve posterior brain regions. The
observed parietal alpha synchronization could thus also reﬂect efﬁ-
cient memory processing in a manner that cognitive resources are
devoted to effective memory search and retrieval. We  will dwell
upon this issue thereinafter.
One question in this particular context that still needs to be
addressed is why  parietal alpha synchronization during creative
ideation is sometimes somewhat more pronounced in right than
in left posterior parietal sites (cf. Benedek et al., 2011; Fink et al.,
2009a,b; see also Martindale, 1999). Note that alpha synchroniza-
tion recorded over the right parietal cortex appears to be more
unique to creative processes, unlike frontal synchronization that
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eems to be generally associated with internal processing demands
Benedek et al., 2011). In search for possible explanations early
oncepts referred to the parallel or holistic processing mode of
ight hemispheric cortices, in contrast to the more sequential,
ogic-analytical processing mode of the left hemisphere (see e.g.,
artindale, 1999); likewise it has been suggested that the right
emisphere operates in a more free-associative, primary process
anner, typically observed in states such as dreaming or reverie
Martindale, 1999). More speciﬁcally, the left hemisphere has been
roposed to be primarily engaged in relatively ﬁne semantic coding
e.g., focusing activation on a single interpretation or meaning of a
erbal stimulus), whereas the right hemisphere is supposed to be
ngaged in more coarse semantic coding by weakly and diffusely
ctivating alternative or more distant associations (cf. Bowden and
ung-Beeman, 2003; Bowden et al., 2005; Jung-Beeman, 2005).
The interpretation of right parietal alpha synchronization dur-
ng creative ideation appears to be particularly challenging when
e take a look at recent fMRI ﬁndings in this ﬁeld. Fink et al.
2009a, 2010, 2012) observed evidence that the generation of
riginal ideas (AU task) in contrast to the production of typical
haracteristics of objects was amongst others associated with com-
aratively low activation (or even with deactivations) in regions
f the right parietal cortex (such as the angular gyrus, AG). Sim-
lar ﬁndings were revealed by Howard-Jones et al. (2005) who
ed their participants generate creative and uncreative stories dur-
ng fMRI assessment. They observed that creative (vs. uncreative)
tory generation was associated with stronger bilateral frontal acti-
ation but lower brain activity in the right inferior parietal lobe.
owatari et al. (2009) reported inverse correlations between cre-
tivity and brain activity in bilateral parietal brain regions while
esigning new pens. In another creativity domain, Berkowitz and
nsari (2010) found that musicians but not non-musicians deac-
ivated the right temporo-parietal junction (including the angular
yrus) during musical improvisation, which was discussed in terms
f inhibition of stimulus-driven attention aiding creative thought
see also Berkowitz and Ansari, 2008).
In reviewing classical lesion and imaging data, Petersen and
osner (2012) recently came up to the conclusion that attentional
rocesses such as tonic alertness or orienting to external stimuli
re strongly lateralized to the right hemisphere (see also Sturm
nd Willmes, 2001). Corbetta and Shulman (2002) and Corbetta
t al. (2008) speciﬁcally propose a strongly right-lateralized ven-
ral cortical network including the temporoparietal junction and
he ventral frontal cortex which is involved during the detection
f behaviorally relevant sensory events. Suppressed or attenuated
ctivity in this region has been observed to occur if attention is
oal-directed and focused, in order to prevent reorienting attention
o task-irrelevant stimuli which would interfere with task perfor-
ance. In fact, deactivations of right temporoparietal brain regions
ave been shown to correlate with successful task performance
for review see, Corbetta et al., 2008). Interestingly, in the creativity
omain it was found that tasks that strongly draw on the originality
acet of creativity were associated with suppressed activity in tem-
oral and parietal brain regions as well (e.g., Berkowitz and Ansari,
010; Fink et al., 2012; Howard-Jones et al., 2005).
Thus, the right-lateralized pattern of deactivations in parietal
rain regions which has been observed in recent fMRI studies
n creativity coincides with right-lateralized increases in parietal
lpha band power in the EEG.2 Right parietal alpha synchronization
2 Note that a direct comparison between EEG and fMRI studies in terms of “acti-
ation” or “deactivation” is somewhat complicated by the fact that EEG alpha power
ncreases during creative ideation relate to a pre-stimulus reference (resting) period,
hile fMRI studies usually report contrasts between two active tasks or conditions
e.g., creative vs. control task).havioral Reviews 44 (2014) 111–123 119
during creative ideation may  thus–similar to prefrontal alpha
synchronization–reﬂect a more focused state of internal atten-
tion that is less likely disturbed by interfering, task-irrelevant
stimuli. But creative ideation would certainly not succeed if merely
distracting information would be temporarily screened out from
consciousness awareness. Given the prominent role of the pari-
etal cortex in different memory-related demands (Cabeza et al.,
2008; Wagner et al., 2005), parietal alpha synchronization during
creative ideation may  be also indicative of a state in which atten-
tion is directed to efﬁcient memory search and retrieval. Wagner
et al. (2005) proposed that posterior parietal brain regions could be
a part of a neural network which is involved in shifting attention
to (or maintaining attention on, respectively) internal mnemonic
representations. Similarly, in the Attention-to-Memory (AtoM)
hypothesis by Cabeza et al. (2008) dorsal parietal brain regions
(largely corresponding to Brodmann area 7) are thought to be
associated with the allocation of attentional resources to mem-
ory retrieval according to the goals of the rememberer, which
they referred to as “top-down attention” (Cabeza et al., 2008).
“Bottom-up attention”, in contrast, is driven by incoming sensory
information such as the capturing of attentional resources by rele-
vant memory cues and is supported by a more ventrally located
attentional network of the parietal cortex (including the supra-
marginal and angular gyri; note that in in the AtoM model attention
is triggered by incoming information that can both come from the
senses or from memory, p. 618).
4. Conclusions and potential future research directions
The reported studies on the relationship between EEG alpha
power and creative ideation have yielded a reliable and robust pic-
ture of some brain mechanisms underlying creativity, which may
be among the most consistent ﬁndings in this ﬁeld. The frequently
observed alpha power increases during creative ideation could
reﬂect more internally oriented attention that is characterized by
the absence of external bottom-up stimulation, the inhibition of
task-irrelevant cognitive processes and, thus, a form of top-down
activity. They could also indicate the involvement of speciﬁc mem-
ory processes such as the efﬁcient (re-)combination of unrelated
semantic information. Taken as a whole, however, neuroscientiﬁc
research on creativity is still at an early stage of its development
and there are a number of important issues that are in great need to
be addressed in future research in order to make the ﬁeld advancing
more effectively.
Some critical issues deal with speciﬁc methodological details
in the employed experimental designs and measurements pro-
cedures. In this review we focused on the cognitive process
of creative ideation. But even for this construct we observed a
considerable variability of methodological approaches. Creative
ideation tasks differed in many basic task properties including
that (a) instructions either focused on ﬂuency or creativity of
ideas, (b) the task duration, which was ranging from some seconds
to some minutes, (c) the reference duration, again ranging from
a few seconds to some minutes, (d) responses should either be
verbalized immediately or withheld until the end of the task, (e)
tasks were performed with eyes open but in some studies also with
eyes closed, (f) the tasks differed in other features such as modality
(i.e., verbal vs. ﬁgural tasks) or complexity. Most of these task
properties can be argued to directly affect the expected results.
Moreover, studies also differed in many aspects of quantifying
brain activation including the use of either raw power measures,
or event-related power changes. In addition, some of the studies
analyzed alpha power in different alpha sub-bands (lower and
upper alpha band), while others focused on the broad alpha
frequency range. Of course, the variation of methods could be seen
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reported exciting empirical evidence whereupon structural brain
characteristics are signiﬁcantly associated with performance in20 A. Fink, M. Benedek / Neuroscience and
s major source of scientiﬁc discovery and should be used to test
he robustness of ﬁndings. However, this is only true when most
eneral factors are held constant and only some speciﬁc factors are
aried intentionally according to an experimental design. Unless
tudies are not consistent in basic aspects of the design, their
esults cannot be compared and integrated reasonably.
Besides the consistent use of well-established methods, future
esearch in this ﬁeld should also speciﬁcally focus on the time-course
f creative ideation. Alpha oscillations during creative ideation
ave been studied in relatively long time intervals, and power
stimates were obtained for comparatively long periods of time.
his is unsatisfying, particularly for the following two reasons.
irst, it is commonly known that the generation of creative ideas
ccurs in different stages or phases and might thus considerably
ary as a function of time (Finke et al., 1992). And second, the
igh temporal resolution of EEG techniques would be especially
uited to study the time-course of creative ideation. There are
ome exciting studies which focused on the time-course of brain
ctivity during insightful problem solving or the subjective expe-
ience of “AHA!” (e.g., Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al.,
006; Sandkühler and Bhattacharya, 2008; Sheth et al., 2009). For
nstance, in employing EEG time-frequency analyses, Jung-Beeman
t al. (2004) observed evidence that the right-hemispheric alpha
ffect over parietal-occipital sites they observed in insight- vs. non-
nsightful solutions (i.e., more alpha in insightful solutions) was
nly apparent from approx. 1.4 until 0.4 s before response (see
. 506). In a similar vein, Sandkühler and Bhattacharya (2008)
s well as Sheth et al. (2009) utilized sophisticated EEG analysis
echniques for the quantiﬁcation of spatio-temporal signatures of
rain oscillations which yielded valuable insights into the mani-
old cognitive processes involved in the process of insight which
oes beyond the mere classiﬁcation of insight vs. non-insight solu-
ions.
Studies also need to demonstrate some speciﬁcity of the observed
ffects.  As shown in this article, the concepts of inhibitory top-
own control, internally-directed attention, absence of bottom-up
timulation or attention to memory processes could all be seen as
lausible explanations of some processes involved in creativity. We
ave shown that prefrontal alpha synchronization is relevant for all
asks involving internal processing demands, while alpha synchro-
ization at (right) posterior parietal sites seems to be more speciﬁc
o creative ideation (cf. Benedek et al., 2011). What we need in
his context are methodologically sound experimental designs (e.g.,
anipulating attentional and/or memory demands during creative
deation) in order to disentangle the manifold processes involved
n creativity, thereby allowing for more speciﬁc interpretations of
he observed effects.
Also, the potential impact of individual differences variables such
s sex or intelligence on creativity-related brain activation patterns
eeds to be clariﬁed in future research. Up to the present there
re only some preliminary ﬁndings in this regard. The studies of
ausˇovec (2000) and Fink and Neubauer (2006) for instance were
ble to demonstrate a relationship between intelligence and cre-
tivity on the neurophysiological level. The group of Razumnikova
bserved sex differences with respect to brain activity during
reativity-related tasks (Razumnikova, 2004, 2007b; Razumnikova
t al., 2009; see also Fink and Neubauer, 2006). Beyond that there
re also some studies which point to the importance of other
ndividual differences variables such as extraversion (Fink and
eubauer, 2008). Taken together, these studies do not just yet
mpty into a coherent and consistent picture about the role of indi-
idual differences variables in this context. We  hope that future
esearch will pay attention to this crucial point.
There are beyond that also some general challenges in this
eld that should be brieﬂy mentioned (see also Arden et al., 2010;
ietrich and Kanso, 2010):havioral Reviews 44 (2014) 111–123
• Conceptual clarity.  Perhaps the most important problem in the
neuroscientiﬁc study of creativity is a general lack of concep-
tual clarity. While researchers usually aim to investigate the
neural correlates of creativity, they can actually address only a
speciﬁc aspect of the construct. As brieﬂy outlined in the intro-
duction, creativity can be viewed from many conceptual levels
including transient creative states, creative potential, or creative
achievement and so on. Moreover, creativity may  refer to differ-
ent deﬁnitions such as divergent thinking, imagination, cognitive
ﬂexibility, or insight, and it may  be related to different domains
such as story generation, poetry, drawing, or musical improvisa-
tion. Surely, we cannot expect consistent brain correlates related
to all of these processes (cf. Dietrich and Kanso, 2010). But the
diversity of possible conceptualizations of creativity led to the
employment of a broad diversity of different tasks and methods
and we believe that this is the major reason why this ﬁeld has
produced highly variegated results, which ﬁnally led to rather dis-
appointing conclusions on our understanding of potential neural
mechanisms underlying creativity (Arden et al., 2010; Dietrich
and Kanso, 2010). Consequently, future studies need to be very
speciﬁc in their deﬁnitions of the construct under investigation.
This does not only involve the differentiation of creativity from
other classic mental ability constructs such as intelligence. There
is also the general challenge to decompose the complex con-
struct of creativity into deﬁnable neurocognitive processes (see e.g.,
Dietrich and Kanso, 2010), and at the same time maintaining valid
psychometric properties in the tasks and paradigms that are used
(Arden et al., 2010). In using psychometrically sound tasks that
involve well-deﬁned creativity-related demands, ﬁndings need
to be replicated across different studies and laboratories, which
would in the long run also facilitate the promotion of neurocog-
nitive theories of speciﬁc aspects related to creativity.
• Adequate neurocognitive theories and methods. The neural
basis of creativity can deﬁnitely not be quantiﬁed in terms of
“activation” or “deactivation” of some speciﬁc brain regions. Nei-
ther can creativity or creative ideation be localized in a speciﬁc
brain area. Creative cognitive processes can rather be seen as
the result of the functional interplay between brain areas of
a complex neural network involved in various cognitive pro-
cesses such as semantic information processing, memory, or
attention. In order to learn more about the functional con-
nectivity network underling creativity, we  need to focus not
only on single brain parameters but rather on the combined
use of well-established and functionally well-deﬁned neurosci-
entiﬁc measurement approaches. Such combined approaches
should be applied on similar tasks involving well-deﬁned, iso-
lated neurocognitive processes. In this way, ﬁndings across
different studies and laboratories would be better compara-
ble. For instance, EEG techniques that measure the functional
cooperation (or functional coupling, respectively) between dif-
ferent cortical areas might provide an extremely valuable tool
in the study of creativity (Bhattacharya and Petsche, 2005;
Jausˇovec, 2000; Jausˇovec and Jausˇovec, 2000; Mölle et al., 1999;
Petsche, 1996; Razumnikova, 2000, 2004, 2007a). Also, studies
using fMRI would be extremely helpful in this context par-
ticularly with respect to their high spatial resolution. Such
combined approaches appear to be especially exciting in view
of the rapidly increasing availability of new and more ﬁne-
grained neuroscientiﬁc methods aiming at delineating structural
characteristics of the brain associated with creativity (such as cor-
tical thickness, gray matter, fractional anisotropy etc.; see e.g.,
Takeuchi et al., 2010). For instance, Jung et al. (2010b) recentlydifferent well-established divergent thinking tasks. The same
group reported a magnetic resonance spectroscopy study in
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which they investigated the relationship between brain chem-
istry (concentrations of the neurometabolite N-acetyl-aspartate)
and divergent thinking (Jung et al., 2009), and another study
in which they investigated the relationship between creativity
and white matter integrity (as assessed by fractional anisotropy;
Jung et al., 2010a). These studies seem to converge into a coher-
ent picture as they “. . . point to a decidedly left lateralized,
fronto-subcortical, and disinhibitory network of brain regions
underlying creative cognition and achievement . . .”  (Arden et al.,
2010, p. 152). It would be particularly exciting to see some stud-
ies in future which use both structural and functional methods in
the same sample of participants, in order to learn how structural
characteristics relate to functional brain activity patterns during
creative thought.
Generalizability to “real-life” creativity.  And ﬁnally, the vast
majority of studies in this ﬁeld used (or were required to use,
respectively) comparatively simple type of tasks, and the ques-
tion as to how the observed ﬁndings might be generalizable
to “real-life” creative achievements still remains unresolved. So
once we are conﬁdent in the understanding of relevant basic brain
mechanisms relevant for creativity, we may move a step fur-
ther by investigating brain activity in more complex, “real-life”
creativity tasks (cf. Hasson and Honey, 2012). There are some
promising approaches following this direction, e.g. the studies of
Berkowitz and Ansari (2010), Bhattacharya and Petsche (2005),
Ellamil et al. (2012), or Kowatari et al. (2009), who extended neu-
roscientiﬁc research to the domain of artistic creativity including
the study of brain activity during musical improvisation, visual
art or designing book covers or new pens, respectively. Sim-
ilarly, brain correlates underlying creativity have mostly been
studied in samples of university students or in samples of the
normal population. Studies employing more “creativity-related”
samples such as artists, musicians, dancers etc. are comparatively
rare in literature. Some noteworthy exceptions are the studies by
Petsche (1996), Bhattacharya and Petsche (2005), Chávez-Eakle
et al. (2007) or Fink et al. (2009b) who investigated creativity-
related brain activity in samples of scientists, musicians, artists
or dancers.
cknowledgements
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